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ABSTRACT
With the birth of RFID technology, businesses gained the
ability to tag products with practically invisible computer chips
that relay information about consumer behavior to remote
databases. Such tagging permits retailers and manufacturers to
track the purchases, identities, and movements of their customers.
In the absence of enforceable regulations, society risks being
subjected to an unprecedented level of Orwellian surveillance. This
iBrief addresses consumer privacy concerns stemming from the
proliferation of RFID technology. It discusses why tort law, state
legislation, FTC guidelines, and proposed regulations are
insufficient methods to alleviate consumer privacy concerns and
suggests amending various federal privacy laws, thereby
prohibiting the underlying RFID tracking behavior.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
A problem has arisen at the intersection of privacy and technology.
There is “an amazingly ambitious scheme to infest the entire physical
infrastructure of the planet with a spray-on global blanket of Internet
interactivity.” 2 This “global blanket” is comprised of small data chips
placed in moveable objects across the world that wirelessly communicate
information about objects and their purchasers to anyone who has the
technology to track it. The idea for the product-tracking technology was
developed in 1997 as a result of the popularity of Oil of Olay’s ColorMoist
Hazelnut No. 650. 3 The inventor was neither a government agency nor an
engineer. Rather, it was Kevin Ashton, a brand manager for Proctor &
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Gamble. 4 Ashton, attempting to resolve a supply-chain quandary over the
overwhelming popularity of lipstick, determined that placing a small chip,
known as a Radio Frequency Information Device (RFID), on all lipstick
packages would solve his stocking dilemma. He tested his idea in Broken
Arrow, Oklahoma. When a customer removed the lipstick from the shelf,
the RFID on the product’s packaging sent information to databases in
Cincinnati, informing Wal-Mart of reordering needs. 5 While RFID
technology helped solve Wal-Mart’s and other retailers’ stocking problems,
it also opened a Pandora’s Box of privacy issues. Currently, there are no
enforceable laws to control the spying and tracking actions of businesses
and private individuals. Without regulations, the use of RFID chips in
consumer products raises fears that “consumer behaviors” will be
monitored, “third-party surveillance” will occur, “customer relationship[s]”
will be managed, and individuals’ identities and locations will be
susceptible to constant monitoring. 6
¶2
This iBrief will address the issues surrounding consumer privacy
and RFIDs. Specifically, Part I will discuss the basic principles of RFID
technology, detailing the various components of RFIDs and discussing how
the technology functions as a communication device. Part II will address
the scope of RFID use in the commercial environment, including its
efficiencies and inefficiencies. Part III will evaluate the intrusion upon
4
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seclusion tort as a theory of privacy protection and criticize the inability of
this tort to keep pace with technological developments. Part IV will detail
the challenges of using tort law to redress RFID offenses. Part V will
analyze the various approaches of protecting consumers’ privacy from
RFID tracking, including legislation at the state level and regulation
proposals from privacy advocates. Lastly, Part VI will provide suggestions
for the most effective RFID legislation and the steps necessary for
implementation of that legislation.

ANALYSIS
I. WHAT ARE RFIDS? HOW DO RFIDS WORK?
¶3
RFID technology is an automatic identification system that
identifies objects, collects data, and transmits information about the object
through a “tag.” A device called a reader extracts and processes the
information on the tag. Experts characterize RFIDs as devices “that can be
sensed at a distance by radio frequencies with few problems of obstruction
or misorientation.” 7 In essence, RFIDs are wireless barcodes. 8 However,
unlike typical barcodes, which are identical for all common products, each
RFID has a unique identification. Therefore, every individually tagged item
has a different barcode sequence. Typical barcodes also require
unobstructed paths for scanning, whereas RFIDs can be scanned through
solid objects. 9 RFIDs have communication signals that facilitate data
storage on RFID tags and enable the stored information to be gathered
electronically—hypothetically permitting, for example, Coca-Cola to have a
database storing information about the life cycle of a Coke can. The
database would contain tracking details from the moment the can is
manufactured through its processing at a garbage dump—since RFID
readers can be attached to garbage trucks. Between the birth and death of a
customer’s Coke can, the RFID tags would tell the Cola-Cola Company
where and when the Coke was purchased, what credit card the Coke was
purchased with, and, in turn, the identity of the purchaser. Even if the
customer did not purchase the Coke with a credit card, state issued ID cards
equipped with RFID technology could relay the customer’s identity to
RFID readers as he or she leaves the store. 10 Coca-Cola’s final product of
7
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the RFIDs’ communications is a database of the life cycles of individual
cans of Coke and personal information about their purchasers. 11 With this
myriad of information, Coca-Cola has the ability to individually market to
each of the 1.3 billion daily Coca-Cola consumers. 12
¶4
There are three components of an RFID that permit the life cycle of
a Coke can to be tracked: a chip, an antenna, and a reader. Together, the
chip and the antenna are called a tag. A unique identification number, called
an Electronics Product Code, is encoded in a small silicon chip that is
typically smaller than three square inches. 13 The antenna, which can take
the form of many shapes, radiates from the chip. 14 The antenna sends out
radio signals that trigger the tag and permit information to be written onto
and read from it. 15 The third component of an RFID is the reader. Also
called the scanning device, the reader communicates with the tag through its
own antenna. 16 Once an RFID tag comes within a few feet of the reader,
the tag’s antenna finds the reader’s signal and directs the energy to the
chip. 17 The chip then beams its unique identification number and other
information stored on the chip to the reader. The reader then processes the
information and typically relays the data to a database where it can be
tracked and stored. Readers range in price from $20 to $1000. One variety,
costing $150, is even adaptable to PDAs. 18 The low cost and ability to store
a reader in the PCMCIA slot of a PDA permits businesses and individuals
to own and use readers at their leisure.
¶5
There are passive and active tags. Passive tags are dormant until a
reader beams the tag. Scanning by the reader activates communication
between the devices. Active tags, on the other hand, are simply passive tags
with an energy source, permitting them to continually transmit information,

(authorizing Department of Homeland Security to require state ID cards and
drivers licenses to be equipped with RFID technology).
11
While database storage poses an entire privacy issue on its own, exploration
of database privacy is beyond the scope of this iBrief.
12
The Coca-Cola Company, http://www.thecocacolacompany.com/citizenship/our_business.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
13
The smallest chip, produced by Hitachi, is 0.3 square millimeters. Hitachi
Unveils Smallest RFID Chip, RFID J., Mar. 14, 2003,
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/337/1/1/.
14
ALBRECHT & MCINTYRE, supra note 7, at 14.
15
David Flint, Everything With Chips!, BUS. L. REV., Mar. 2006, 73, 73.
16
STAFF OF THE FED, supra note 6, at 4 (citing RSA Laboratories,
http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2007)).
17
ALBRECHT & MCINTYRE, supra note 7, at 16.
18
Get RFID Readers in a Flash, RFID J., Apr. 22, 2003,
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without the activation of a reader. The cost for a passive tag can be as low
as a few cents, and passive tags are typically priced between $0.20 and
$0.40. 19 From a cost standpoint, the tags’ low cost permits essentially all
merchandise to be tagged with RFIDs. Although passive tags appear
passive, by installing readers at various entrance points, including store
entrances and freeway exits, the tags are essentially functionally active. 20
Locating the whereabouts of persons and objects simply requires scanning
passive tags at these points of entrance. Because readers can scan multiple
tags simultaneously, one reader can capture a great deal of location and
information data in a short span of time.

II. HOW ARE RFIDS USED?
¶6
RFIDs are currently used in many ways, including, “livestock
management[,] 24 hour patient monitoring[,] authentication of
pharmaceuticals[,] tracking consignments in a supply chain[,] remote
monitoring of critical components in aircraft[, and] monitoring the safety of
perishable food.” 21 Advocates of RFID technology, including retailers and
manufacturers, praise the increased functionality and efficiency that will
likely ensue from using RFIDs. Once all products are individually tagged,
shoppers are expected to be able to purchase items without checking-out.
This should be possible since RFID readers will be able to scan every item
as the customer exits the store and charge an RFID credit card, thereby
simultaneously increasing efficiency and possibly reducing shoplifting.
Other RFID uses include easy monitoring of product recalls, tracking
lobsters for conservation purposes, and purchasing products with
transaction-free payment systems. 22 Additionally, in October 2003, the
Department of Defense set standards mandating suppliers to place RFID

19

RFID System Components and Costs, RFID J.,
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleprint/1336/-1/129/ (last visited Feb. 15,
2007).
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Information Society and Media, Address at EU RFID 2006 Conference:
Heading for the Future, RFID: WHY WE NEED A EUROPEAN POLICY, 1, 3 (Oct.
16, 2006), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/597&f
ormat=PDF&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; see also MICHAEL J.
TAVILLA, RFID, NAT’L ELEC. COMMERCE COORDINATING COUNCIL 5-7 (2005),
http://rfidprivacy.mit.edu/access/pdfs/report-ec3.pdf.
22
Flint, supra note 15, at 1.

5

2007

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 3

tags on all packaging for the Department of Defense. 23 Thus, RFIDs can be
used to increase efficiency and safety.
¶7
The RFID uses enumerated above, however, are not the uses that
drive privacy concerns. Rather, it is the spying on individuals and the
profiling of their identities that are at issue. According to a study provided
by Auto-ID Center, seventy-eight percent of consumers are “extremely or
very concerned” about the uses of RFID technology 24 —likely because they
fear customer profiling and care about keeping their identities private from
businesses. These concerns stem from the lack of current laws protecting
consumers from data collection and sharing. Some companies cannot be
trusted with the data that they collect, and existing privacy laws do not help
individuals hide the information they expect to be concealed from the
public. 25 A consumer who purchases RFID tagged items is vulnerable to
various types of surveillance. For example, consider customers carrying
RFID-enabled health-insurance cards in their wallets purchasing shopping
carts full of junk food at the grocery store. If the health insurance company
placed RFID readers at grocery store entrances, the reader would activate
the RFID tag in the consumers’ wallets and collect information about their
recent grocery purchases. From the health-insurance card the insurance
carrier could determine the customers’ identities and learn that they are
prone to diabetes. When the junk food purchases are aggregated into their
policy files, the purchases could trigger increases in the consumers’ health
insurance.
¶8
The capabilities of RFID technology now permit businesses to
snoop into the lives of customers in ways that were never before possible. 26
23

PRESS RELEASE, US DEP. OF DEFENSE, DOD ANNOUNCES RADIO FREQUENCY
IDENTIFICATION POLICY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NEWS
RELEASE, (OCT. 23, 2003),
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20031023-0568.html.
24
ALBRECHT & MCINTYRE, supra note 7, at 154 (quoting PHYLLIS L. KIM,
FLEISHMAN-HILLARD, AUTO ID CENTER COMMUNICATIONS (2001),
http://cryptome.org/rfid/pk-fh.pdf); see Beth Bacheldor, Study: RFID Not WellKnown by Consumers, INFO.WK., June 24, 2004,
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=22101950.
25
See Anick Jesdanun, 3 AOL Subscribers Sue Over Data Release, ABC NEWS,
Sept. 25, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=2489737;
Complaint, Kasadore Ramkisson v. AOL, No. 06-5866 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 22,
2006) (bringing suit under the Electronic Communication Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2702, for posting AOL users search queries).
26
EPIC RFID Privacy Page, http://www.epic.org/privacy/rfid/ (last visited Feb.
15, 2007); see U.S. Patent App. 20020165758 (filed May 3, 2001), available at
http://appft1.uspto.gov/netacgi/nphParser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PG01&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPT
O%2Fsrchnum.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=%2220020165758%22.PGNR.&OS
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The NCR Corporation 27 stated that RFID-enabled loyalty cards permit
businesses to identify customers and change the prices of items based on the
purchasing profile of the customer. 28 A clothing retailer could tag
purchased garments with customers’ credit card information and determine
how much money they are likely to spend as they enter the store. 29 Sales
representatives could quickly target or avoid customers depending on their
historical purchasing habits. 30 RFID data collection could be used as
evidence in divorce trials, helping prove where and when a spouse was
being unfaithful. 31 Thieves could use RFID devices to determine if their
culprits are carrying expensive items in their purses. 32 As these examples
show, “the ability to remain anonymous is eroded.” 33 With personal
information available to anyone who has a reader, privacy will soon become
obsolete unless there are laws regulating the potential for Orwellian
surveillance.

III. DO CONSUMERS HAVE A RIGHT TO PRIVACY FROM RFIDS
UNDER TORT LAW?
¶9
Consumers have a right to privacy under the common law tort of
intrusion upon seclusion only when two elements are satisfied. First, the
information must be pulled in places that are highly “offensive or
objectionable to a reasonable man,” and second, “the thing into which there
is prying or intrusion [is] entitled to be, private.” 34 Intrusion upon seclusion
is a tort protecting individuals against “intentional[] intru[sion], physically
or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs

=DN/20020165758&RS=DN/20020165758 (describing a method for tracking
identities and characteristics of individuals to “monitor movement throughout
the store.”); U.S. Patent No. 6,659,344 (filed Dec. 6, 2000), available at
http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nphParser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPT
O%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=6659344.PN.&OS=PN/6659344&RS
=PN/6659344 (describing a method of gathering data of supermarket shoppers
behaviors by placing readers on shopping carts in order to “take specific
responses to the actions of the shoppers”).
27
“NCR Corporation . . . along with its subsidiaries provides technology and
services that help businesses interact, connect and relate with their customers.”
Google Finance, http://finance.google.com/finance?q=NCR (last visited Feb. 15,
2007).
28
ALBRECHT & MCINTYRE, supra note 7, at 74.
29
See id. at 74–75.
30
See id.
31
Declan McCullagh, RFID Tags: Big Brother in Small Packages, CNET
NEWS.COM, Jan. 13, 2003, http://news.com.com/2010-1069-980325.html.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 390–91 (1960).
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or concerns . . . if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.” 35 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis introduced the theory of the
right to privacy in 1890, proclaiming that “[t]he right to life has come to
mean the right to enjoy life,—the right to be let alone.” 36 When people are
in the seclusion of their home, they are undoubtedly entitled to privacy. 37
However, an individual’s expectation of privacy is not limited to inside the
home. 38 A reasonable expectation of privacy can exist in one’s shopping
bag in a store, 39 when one withdraws money from a bank account, 40 and in
a phone booth. 41 In order for the plaintiff to have a claim, the defendant
must have “penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy
surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data about, the plaintiff.” 42
In the context of RFIDs, there are some situations where gathering
information from RFID tags violates consumers’ privacy expectations. For
example, a consumer does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
when carrying RFID equipped items in a transparent shopping cart.
However, once the items are placed in an opaque bag, a right to privacy
immediately arises. 43 If a business or third-party gathers data about the
items once the items are no longer visible to the naked eye, there is an
objective invasion of privacy. 44 Gathering information stored in the RFID
tag in a winter jacket worn in public is also not an invasion of privacy, yet
pulling data off undergarments is intrusive. 45 However, since the home is
always considered a private place, once an active RFID tag enters the home,
any information gathered, including information from the winter jacket,
immediately offends the principles of privacy. Protecting consumers from
unreasonably intrusive actions of businesses requires that RFID tags
become unreadable once they enter private places. However, the
fundamental nature of the technology does not harmonize with this privacy
¶10

35

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4. HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193 (1890).
37
See Prosser, supra note 34, at 392; see also DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146,
149 (Mich. 1881) (finding a right to privacy in one’s apartment).
38
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
39
Prosser, supra note 34, at 389 (citing Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 110 S.E.2d
716 (W. Va. 1959)).
40
Nader v. General Motors, 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
41
Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
42
Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d. 469, 490 (Cal. 1998).
43
See Prosser, supra note 34 at 390-91.
44
Id.
45
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. c (1977) (“Even in a public
place . . . there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or
lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze; and there may still be an
invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.”).
36
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goal because RFID readers do not scrutinize whether the information is
considered private before it gathers data from the tag.
¶11
For the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, the “highly offensive”
element normally requires more than simple visual surveillance or
photography in a public place unless the individual is attempting to keep his
actions private. 46 Thus, the moment an individual enters a private place,
actions that were not considered highly offensive because they occurred in
public should be immediately deemed highly offensive. It follows that any
item entering the home with a readable RFID tag should be highly offensive
to the reasonable person. However, with new and continuously evolving
technologies, what individuals consider offensive and private is continually
changing. For example, in Dwyer v. American Express Co., 47 the court
rejected an American Express cardholder’s claim of intrusion upon
seclusion when American Express data-mined the plaintiff’s spending
patterns and sold the collected information to merchants. 48 The court
stated:

By using the American Express card, a cardholder is voluntarily, and
necessarily, giving information to defendants that, if analyzed, will
reveal a cardholder’s spending habits and shopping preferences. We
cannot hold that a defendant has committed an unauthorized intrusion
by compiling the information voluntarily given to it and then renting
its compilation. 49
¶12
With new technologies come new methods of consumer tracking
and changing parameters for what may be considered highly offensive.
These new methods of tracking are not considered intrusive simply because
the nature of the technology requires consumer purchases to be recorded. If
individuals make active decisions to use a credit card instead of cash—a
voluntary act—their purchases can be tracked. Similarly, the gathering of
information stored on RFID technology in consumer goods may not be
deemed highly offensive depending on changing consumer expectations.
¶13
The ability to track an item and an individual at any time does not
alone make the technology highly offensive. Rather, the ability of RFID
technology to track an item becomes highly offensive where there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy. With RFID technology third parties are
able to secretly track individuals by “skimming” and “eavesdropping.” 50
46

Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 914–15 (1999) (citing
Shulman, 955 P.2d. at 490).
47
652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
48
Id. at 1353.
49
Id. at 1354 (emphasis added).
50
Another major privacy issue with RFID tags, both in identification cards and
consumer products, relates to private third parties skimming or eavesdropping.
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Data that may otherwise not be available to third parties becomes readily
obtainable at any place where there is an active RFID reader. Thus, the
placement and presence of RFID tags in consumer goods permits the highly
intrusive gathering of information when the items are in private places.
Despite this issue, individuals will have a difficult time bringing a valid
cause of action since they will not know when items they carry are equipped
with RFID tags and whether the information is being procured when they
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

IV. WHAT CHALLENGES ARISE WHEN USING TORT LAW TO
REDRESS RFID OFFENSES?
¶14
It is often difficult to meet the burden of proof required for intrusion
upon seclusion. 51 There are some circumstances, including when the item
is in public view, where gathering information from RFIDs is almost never
tortious. There are other circumstances when the same act of information
gathering is tortious. For example, in Nader v. General Motors, the court
stated that “only ‘overzealous’ public surveillance is actionable.” 52 It is
difficult to argue that a small RFID chip, sewn into clothing seams, is
“overzealous” public surveillance. Therefore, it is inaccurate to conclude
that using RFID technology to collect data is highly offensive when the
information can be gathered by means that are not “overzealous.” 53
¶15
Additionally, under the theory of intrusion upon seclusion, plaintiffs
must prove damages, which could be difficult for this technology. 54 For a
successful intrusion upon seclusion action against a business or individual
that uses RFID technology, a plaintiff can “recover damages for (a) the
harm to his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion; (b) his mental

Two Reports Criticize Security, Privacy Holes in RFID Technology, EPIC
ALERT 13.22 (Electronic Privacy Information Center, Washington, D.C.), Nov.
1, 2006, http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC_Alert_13.22.html (“Skimming occurs
when information from an RFID chip is surreptitiously gathered by an
unauthorized individual. Eavesdropping occurs when an individual intercepts
data as it is read by an authorized RFID reader.”). While third party
interferences are mentioned, a detailed analysis of the issues of skimming and
eavesdropping is beyond the scope of this iBrief.
51
Adam J. Tutaj, Intrusion Upon Seclusion: Bringing an Otherwise Valid Cause
of Action into the 21st Century, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 665, 666 (1998).
52
Id. at 683 (quoting 255 N.E.2d 765,771 (N.Y. 1970)). In Nader, the
defendants engaged in unauthorized surveillance of bank records. Nader, 255
N.E.2d at 765.
53
Tutaj, supra note 51 at 666.
54
Alan F. Blakley, Daniel P. Garrie, & Matthew J. Armstrong, Coddling Spies:
Why the Law Doesn’t Adequately Address Computer Spyware, 2005 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 0025 (2005),
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2005dltr0025.html.
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distress proved to have been suffered if it is of a kind that normally results
from such an invasion; and (c) special damage of which the invasion is a
legal cause.” 55 The Restatement (Second) of Torts is silent on whether a
plaintiff could receive restitution damages for the value that the defendant
gained by intruding upon the seclusion of the plaintiff. 56 A separate cause
of action may need to be brought for a plaintiff to receive restitution.
¶16
With respect to the amount of damages that make a cause of action
feasible, a single plaintiff’s legal claim against a retailer for scanning will
probably not amount to enough relief for the claim to be justified, especially
since punitive damages are not guaranteed. Further, since most individuals
are not aware of the existence of RFID tags in their purchases, 57 and
because the technology does not require any true physical imposition on the
individual, retailers and manufacturers will not be pressured to cease their
intrusive actions on scattered tort claims. In addition, from a plaintiff’s or
mass-tort perspective, it is not feasible to bring a suit against all
manufacturers and retailers that use RFID technology. And, it is not
effective for a plaintiff to bring suit against only one company because a
cause of action against one business would not impinge on the actions of
other businesses. To prohibit all retailers from using RFIDs in intrusive
manners, the plaintiff would have to sue every retailer and plead for
injunctive relief. While one win for the plaintiff may deter other possible
defendants, a cost-benefit analysis by large companies using RFID
technology would likely justify continued use.
¶17
RFID tracking is tortious under a theory of intrusion upon seclusion
only when a reader pulls information from RFID tags when the item is
located in a place where its owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy
and when the action is highly offensive. While there are some situations
where both elements of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion are satisfied,
such as when the RFID is located in the privacy of one’s home, there are
many potentially intrusive uses of RFID for which it will be difficult for a
plaintiff to prove the tortious conduct and establish harm. Furthermore,
even if RFID technology is “overzealous” and even if it is practical for a
plaintiff to bring a claim, courts have been reluctant to permit plaintiffs to
use intrusion upon seclusion for technology claims in the twenty-first

55

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H (1977).
“One whose name, likeness or identity is appropriated to the use of another,
under [Restatement (Second) of Torts] § 652C, may recover for the loss of the
exclusive use of the value so appropriated.” Id. at cmt. a. When there has been
appropriation, the plaintiff may recover a value equal to that of which the
defendant was enriched by the fraud. Id.
57
A survey “conducted by Capgemini and National Federation found that 77%
of consumers were not familiar with RFID.” Bacheldor, supra note 24.
56
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century. 58 As new technologies continue to enter the market, an industry
sector approach to regulation is becoming the legal trend: Congress passes
statutes for industry-specific technology to protect consumer privacy. 59
However, almost a decade after the birth of RFIDs, the technology has yet
to be regulated.

V. WITHOUT TORT LAW, WHAT PROTECTS CONSUMERS?
¶18
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which governs RFIDs,
currently permits companies to craft their own guidelines concerning the
use of customer data collected through RFID technology. 60 As part of selfregulation, the FTC encourages businesses to notify consumers of the
existence of RFIDs in their products and to inform customers of the type of
data that is being collected and the data’s intended use. 61 However, the
FTC “has not taken any enforcement actions against any companies and has
not compiled any statistics as to who is using RFID technology . . . .” 62
Under the current self-regulatory scheme, it is unlikely that the FTC will
ever take enforcement actions because it can only enforce regulations that a
company sets for itself and subsequently violates. 63 Thus, if a company
does not establish standards for self-enforcement, then failing to notify the
user of the existence of RFIDs will not be a violation and the FTC cannot
take action. As there are very limited situations in which the FTC would
have the ability to take enforcement actions, self-regulation is not an
effective means of regulation.
¶19
Without current laws actively monitoring and regulating the actions
of businesses’ RFID uses, the information gathering and aggregation
occurring as a result of RFID technology may expose customers to harmful
invasions of privacy. Although state legislatures have begun efforts to
legislate RFID technology at the state level and privacy advocates have set
forth numerous state legislative proposals, federal regulation is ultimately
needed to effectively protect consumers. The efforts at the state level have

58

See White v. White, 781 A.2d 85 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001) (finding no
reasonable expectation to privacy in e-mail).
59
Hildner, supra note 4, at n.144 (listing industry-specific technologies).
60
Jonathan Collins, FTC Asks RFID Users to Self-Regulate, RFID J., Mar. 10,
2005, http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/view/1437/1/1/; see, 5 U.S.C. §§ 41–
58 (2000) (Federal Trade Commission Act).
61
Collins, supra note 60.
62
Claire Swedberg, FTC Readies an RFID Report, RFID J., Oct. 5, 2004,
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleprint/1151/-1/1/.
63
Hildner, supra note 4, at 145 (noting further, that if FTC chooses to institute
its own regulatory guidelines the investigation and negotiation before judicial
review bodies would be burdensome to the FTC and likely cause lengthy
procedural delays).
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not been very successful and the proposals from advocacy groups are
limited in scope. International regulatory regimes, while not perfect, may
provide some guidance as to how the United States should tackle the RFID
issue.

A. RFID Regulation at the State Level
¶20
In 2006, at least seventeen states introduced RFID-related
legislation. 64 Georgia, New Hampshire and Wisconsin adopted RFIDrelated legislation while California and Rhode Island each vetoed RFIDrelated bills. 65 In 2005, privacy bills regulating RFIDs were introduced in
twelve state legislatures. 66 Likewise, in 2004, several state legislatures
actively sought RFID legislation. 67
¶21

RFID legislation at the state level typically targets five different

issues:
1. “Requir[ing] disclosure”;
2. “Requir[ing] removal or deactivation”;
3. “Prohibit[ing] linking RFID data to personal
information”;
4. “Prohibit[ing] use” in general; and
5. Criminalization. 68
¶22
These state legislative measures, however, have not adequately
addressed the privacy concerns raised by RFID technology for several

64

2006 Privacy Legislation Related to Radio Frequency Identification, NEWS
Conference of State Legislatures), Oct. 2006,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/rfid06.htm.
65
Id.
66
2005 Privacy Legislation Related to Radio Frequency Identification, NEWS
FROM THE STATES (National Conference of State Legislatures), Jan. 30, 2006,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/rfid05.htm.
67
See H.B. 32, 418th Gen Assem., Reg Sess. (Md. 2004); S.J.R. 10, 56th Leg.,
Gen. Sess. (Utah 2004), H.B. 1304, 2004 Sess. (Va. 2004); H.B. 314, 56th Leg.
Gen Sess. (Utah 2004); H.B. 251, 56th Leg. Gen Sess. (Utah 2004); S.B. 867,
92nd Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2004); S.B. 1834, 2004 Reg. Sess.,
(Cal. 2004); H.B. 151, 2004 Sess. (Va. 2004). Maryland, Utah and Virginia’s
bill suggest guidelines for future legislation; Missouri’s bills require labeling;
Utah’s bills require labeling and address the requirement for disabling the
device; and California’s bill addresses the use of personal information. Joshua
Nelson, State Legislatures Address Use of RFID Technology, NEWS FROM THE
STATES (National Conference of State Legislatures), Summer 2004,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/CIP/CIPCOMM/summer04.htm.
68
2006 Privacy Legislation, supra note 64.
FROM THE STATES (National
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reasons. First, no proposed legislation in 2006 confronted all of the alleged
privacy and security issues associated with RFIDs. Second, a majority of
the legislation presented limited situations where prohibition of data linking
is enforceable. 69 Third, regulating RFID technology at the state level is
inherently inefficient because customers who purchase goods in states
where there are no RFID regulations or enforcement are not protected from
retailers located within their home state. For example, if a consumer
purchases a shirt in a state that does not require disclosure of the presence of
RFID technology to consumers, when the consumer returns to his own
home state, information could be read from the RFID tag in his clothing of
which he is not aware. The consumer does not have the ability to know that
information is being pulled from him, nor the opportunity, as some statutes
permit, to allow him to request a copy of the information gathered and its
intended use. Since RFID technology is used to track inventory nationally
and manufacturers supply products to various states, regulating at state
levels interferes with efficient commerce. This is not an effective way to
protect the privacy of our nation’s citizens or promote economy.
¶23
Currently, there is no federal legislation relating to RFIDs. The
only federal action is a proposal for an RFID Caucus. 70 With legislation
occurring at state rather than federal levels, the necessary protections for
consumers have not been established by, let alone introduced to, Congress.

B. Proposals from Privacy Advocates
¶24
Preserving basic liberty rights of a society with technological
advances requires a sensitive balance between creating stringent legal
standards that protect individuals and relaxed regulations that do not deter
innovation and efficiency. As a technology, RFIDs have the capability to
increase efficiency in multiple arenas, especially the retail sector. The
resulting privacy issues, however, are of prime concern. Privacy advocates
have tried to protect consumer fears by proposing multiple regulations and
model codes that place duties on businesses when using RFID technology in

69

Id. (explaining that most bills permit exceptions to the prohibition of data
linking when discussing state or federally issued identification cards).
70
Rfidblogger, Senators Form RFID Caucus, RFID LAW BLOG, June 26, 2006,
http://rfidlawblog.mckennalong.com/archives/federal-legislation-senators-formrfid-caucus.html (stating that the purpose of the caucus is to “[p]rotect exciting
new technologies from premature regulation or legislation in search of a
problem.”). There is also “[f]ederal legislation that details security provisions
that must be in place for Federal Employee ID cards using contact and
contactless smart cards.” CA State Legislation Update, (Association for
Automatic Identification and Mobility), Aug. 29, 2005,
http://www.aimglobal.org/members/news/templates/rfid.asp?articleid=434&zon
eid=3. However, these standards do not protect consumers.
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their products. Each proposal attempts to address the privacy concerns of
consumers by placing restrictions on businesses. Among these proposals
are the Fair Information Practices, The RFID Right to Know Act of 2003,
Electronic Privacy Information Center’s Guidelines on Commercial Use of
RFID Technology, and regulations in the international arena, all of which
detail various means to achieve the requisite balance between efficiency and
personal privacy.
1. Fair Information Practices
¶25
Fair Information Practices refers to the “manner in which entities
collect and use personal information.” 71 The first comprehensive use of
Fair Information Practices appeared in 1973 in the United States
Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s report, Records, Computers
and the Rights of Citizens. 72 Since then, Fair Information Practices have
been used as the foundation for American privacy laws. While some
organizations have fashioned proposed regulations based on Fair
Information Practices, for the purposes of RFID privacy, Fair Information
Practices simply create the basis for a model code detailing principles to
safeguard information privacy. Fair Information Practices are founded on
“five core principles of privacy protection”: notice, choice, access, security,
and enforcement. 73
¶26
If the notion of Fair Information Practices expressly regulated RFID
privacy, a retailer or manufacturer would set privacy regulations for
information gathering and storage. The notice principle would require
consumers to receive “clear and conspicuous notice of an entity’s
information practices before any personal information is collected from
them . . . .” 74 To comply with the notice requirement, retailers would have
to label items with tags or stickers warning the purchaser that the item is
equipped with RFID technology. Further, the label would be required to
mention the purpose of the RFID tag in the specific product, the type of data
the tag collects, how the collected data is used, and the means by which the
information is kept confidential. The choice principle provides consumers
the right to determine how the information gathered about them is used after
a transaction is complete. 75 This principle permits consumers to consent to
the actions taken by the retailer. For instance, the consumer has the right to

71

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS,
June 1998, http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.htm.
72
Id. at n.27.
73
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 71.
74
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION
PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE 14 (May 2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000text.pdf.
75
Id. at 15.
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decide if the retailer can use his personal collected data for “secondary
uses,” such as marketing lists for other companies. 76 The access principle
permits an individual the right to view the gathered information and dispute
its accuracy such that incorrect data does not adversely affect the consumer
based on the retailers’ intended uses. 77 The security principle requires
retailers to protect the gathered information. 78 This may require RFID
encryption, tag removal once an item is purchased, and installation of
database protection technology. Enforcement of the aforementioned
guidelines is essential for consumers to feel comfortable when businesses
use RFID technology.
While Fair Information Practices are composed of crucial principles
that protect consumers from RFID threats, the application of these five
standards is not the end all to regulating RFIDs. Fair Information Practices
do not guarantee absolute consumer protection because information can still
be collected from unsuspecting customers. Specifically, with regards to
RFIDs, the principles do not account for the type of customer profiling that
RFID technology allows. Even if a consumer purchases a product with a
secure RFID tag (security), knows that the purchasing information will be
gathered from the tag (notice), understands that the information will not be
sold to a third party (consent), but does not remove the tag after purchase,
the regulations of RFIDs are not entirely effective. Any RFID tag that
remains on a product after tender jeopardizes the integrity of Fair
Information Practices because the tracking continues to take place. RFID
regulations should permit retailers to use RFID technology to increase
supply-chain efficiency but not at the expense of consumer privacy. There
is a privacy failure if all five principles are satisfied, yet a third party inside
or outside the walls of a store can gather information from the RFID tag as a
result of the information gathering and storage. Thus, Fair Information
Practices are not an adequate means of RFID privacy regulation.
¶27

2. RFID Right to Know Act
¶28
The RFID Right to Know Act, created by Consumers Against
Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering (“CASPIAN”), stipulates
mandatory labeling requirements for products equipped with RFID
technology. 79 The act suggests amendments to current statutes as a means
76

Id.
Id. at 16.
78
Id. at 18.
79
Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering: RFID
Right to Know Act of 2003, http://www.nocards.org/rfid/rfidbill.shtml (last
visited Feb. 15, 2007) (“[C]ommodities containing radio frequency
identification tags bear labels stating that fact, to protect consumer privacy, and
for other purposes.”).
77
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of protecting consumer privacy. These amendments include changes to Fair
Packaging and Labeling Program, 80 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 81 Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 82 Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act, 83 and Chapter 94—Privacy of Title 15 of the U.S.
Code. 84
The proposed legislation amends the language in the
aforementioned statutes to mandate clear and conspicuous labeling on any
“consumer commodity or package” that includes an RFID tag. 85 The
suggested amendment to Title 15, Chapter 94—Privacy, creates an
additional subchapter titled “AGGREGRATION OF NONPUBLIC
PERSONAL INFORMATION AND RADIO FREQUENCY
INDENTIFICATION INFORMATION.” 86 The proposed subchapter
details that businesses shall not:
•

“combine or link an individual’s nonpublic
information with RFID tag identification information
beyond what is required to manage inventory.” 87

•

“disclose to a nonaffiliated third party an individual’s
nonpublic information in association with RFID tag
identification information.” 88

•

“use RFID tag identification information to identify an
individual.” 89

In addition, the subchapter requires the FTC to create standards to insure the
integrity of the information gathering, security, and general harm caused by
RFIDs. 90 Under the proposed legislation the FTC must also disseminate
general educational information regarding RFIDs to consumers and
businesses as well as enforcement.
¶29
Amendments to current statutes are a more effective means of
protecting consumer privacy than Fair Information Practices. On the
positive side, the RFID Right to Know Act provides detailed musts and
must-nots by requiring notice on labels and prohibiting certain uses of
private information. However, the Act also has limitations. The Act does
not consider regulations of consumer products that are not food, drug,
80

15 U.S.C. § 1453 (2000).
21 U.S.C. § 321 (2000).
82
27 U.S.C. § 215 (2000).
83
15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000).
84
15 U.S.C. Ch. 94.
85
RFID Right to Know Act, supra note 79.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
81
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cosmetics, alcohol, and cigarettes. While these types of consumer goods,
most of which are regulated by the FDA, are all commonly equipped with
RFID technology, it is the items that consumers carry with them in public,
specifically clothing and shoes, that require the most stringent regulations,
and are not addressed by the Right to Know Act. Also, one is more likely
to receive poor customer service based on purchasing habits in a retail store
than in grocery stores. Amending legislation for specific consumer goods is
not an efficient way to regulate consumer privacy. Although regulations at
the federal level are crucial, regulating individual products one by one is not
effective. The proposed amendment to Chapter 94-Privacy of Title 15 of
the U.S. Code does not regulate specific products, yet amendments to this
section alone are also insufficient. While it is important for information
linked to individuals to be protected, it is just as crucial to address in detail
the general issues proposed by Fair Information Practices.
3. Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
¶30
EPIC, a leading public interest research center on privacy issues has
formed Guidelines on Commercial Use of RFID Technology. 91 The
guidelines require businesses to notify potential RFID tag holders of the
presence of tags and readers and signal the tag holder when the reader is
pulling information from the tag. 92 The guidelines stipulate that the tags
must be removable and require an analysis to ensure that there are no less
intrusive means to achieve the same goal. If less intrusive means are not
available, the user must obtain written consent after disclosing the purpose,
extent and use of the data collection. According to EPIC’s guidelines,
under no circumstance may personal identification data be distributed to
third parties. 93 Additionally, the collected data must be secure, information
relating to data collecting policies must be available to tag holders, and an
individual’s personal data may be retrieved upon written notice to the
business. 94
¶31
These regulations provide a thorough application of privacy laws to
potential RFID uses. However, the guidelines do not protect an individual’s
privacy outside the commercial arena and create high transaction costs for
businesses, which would likely be transferred to the consumer. From the
standpoint of data collection by corporations, the stringent limitation on use
may be a disincentive to employ RFID technology at all. While the burden
to protect privacy in the commercial environment is rightfully placed on the
retailer and the manufacturer, the EPIC guidelines give consumers
91

See Guidelines on Commercial Use of RFID Technology, EPIC.org, July 9,
2004, http://www.epic.org/privacy/rfid/rfid_gdlnes-070904.pdf.
92

Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
94
Id.
93
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unlimited authority to request information regarding their collected personal
data from the businesses using RFID technology. There are two issues with
this provision of the proposed regulation that affect the business and the
consumer. First, if consumers wish to continually view data collected by a
business, they would have to write multiple letters to the business to keep
track of the personal information the business has gathered. Second, the
business would be forced to aggregate data in way that accommodates
generating reports for every single consumer. This aggregation would
require information to be stored in such a way that requires data to be
attached to a consumer’s identity—which is contrary to the goals of RFID
regulation. In general, EPIC’s proposal would increase costs to business
without the balanced benefits to the consumer.
C. International Approaches
¶32
At the International Conference of Data Protection & Privacy
Commissions a resolution of the required standards for RFID use was
adopted. The standards require:
•

an analysis to ensure that less intrusive means in
achieving the same goal are not possible;

•

that the gathered information is “open and
transparent”;

•

that any collected data is stored only until the purpose
of the information gathering is complete; and

•

that the data on the tags are destroyable. 95

¶33
The European Union also has its own regulations in place that
protect privacy. In fact, there are “strong laws governing the use of data
gathered on consumer[s].” 96 Although the regulations were not initially
enacted for the specific uses of RFIDs, the preexisting laws protect personal
data associated with RFIDs. In Europe, protections are in place because of
the limited range of frequencies for RFID readers. 97 Additionally, the

95

Resolution of Radio Frequency Identification, International Conference of
Data Protection & Privacy Commissions, Nov. 20, 2003,
http://www.privacyconference2003.org/resolutions/res5.DOC.
96
Reuven R. Levary, David Thompson, Kristen Kot & Julie Brothers, RFID,
Electronic Eavesdropping and the Law, RFID J., Feb. 14, 2005,
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1401/1/128.
97
“In the US, there are 60 channels that can be used for deploying RFID readers,
however in Europe there are only 10 channels. This is because a 26 MHz
spectrum is available in the US but only 2 MHz is available in Europe.” RFID in
Europe, RFID GAZETTE, Sept. 23, 2005, available at
http://www.rfidgazette.org/2005/09/rfid_in_europe.html.
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“personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully.”98 In the United
Kingdom, for example, fair and lawful processing of data requires notice to
the consumer and either “consent, contractual necessity, [or] legitimate
interest.” 99 The “e-privacy directive” also requires there to be individual
notice of the data uses, ability to withdraw consent, and capability to
prevent temporary data processing to track consumers’ locations. 100
¶34
These standards are in line with those of the Fair Information
Practices as a means to ensure uniformity within international borders.
However, the international resolution is more restrictive on business than
Fair Information Practices and provides greater protections to consumers.
A balancing test should be the baseline for RFID regulation in the United
States. A balancing test will restrict businesses’ uses of RFID technology in
unnecessary situations, while not inhibiting the needed increased
efficiencies. A balancing test also requires businesses to contemplate their
infringement on their customers’ privacy before implementing unnecessary
tracking standards. Additionally, the approach the European Union has
taken to limit information gathering by restricting the frequencies available
to RFID is an effective way to limit RFID tracking without banning all uses
of the technology.

VI. A SOLUTION.
¶35
According to Kevin Ashton, “[i]t's game over that RFID will be
adopted.” 101 If Ashton is correct, legislation is required to ensure that the
efficiencies of RFID technology continue to exist, while consumer privacy
is protected. Since tort law claims for this technology are not effective,
state laws covering RFIDs are inconsistent and inadequate, and the
proposed federal regulations are flawed, ensuring that RFID use does not
become ubiquitous before appropriate regulations are in place requires
additional action.
¶36
Before the enactment of any RFID legislation, the effects of
technology-specific legislation should be considered.
With new
technologies continually entering the market, adopting regulations that do
not consider the future may have an ill effect on privacy protection for
future surveillance technologies. RFIDs provide cost effective means to
98

Eduardo Ustaran, Data Protection and RFID Systems, 3 PRIVACY & DATA
PROTECTION 6, http://www.berwinleighton.com/download/PDPRFIDtagsimplications.pdf; see Laurant, supra note 5 (quoting Directive on
Privacy and Electronic Communications, OFFICIAL J. EUR. COMMUNITIES 37,
July 12, 2002, http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_201/l_20120020731en00370047.pdf).
99
Ustaran, supra note 98.
100
Id. at 7.
101
MANEY, supra note 4.
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track items and people, but overly strict regulations can deter necessary
RFID uses. Regulations that are too lenient, however, permit businesses to
impinge on consumers’ privacy rights.
Since the scope of RFID uses and potential costs are not certain at
this time, it is crucial that RFID-specific legislation is avoided. Instead,
legislation prohibiting the “underlying behavior” violating privacy
principles should be adopted. 102 One effective way to address RFID
legislation at the federal level is to amend various federal privacy laws as
suggested by the Right to Know Act. Since the federal government has
many broad privacy protection statutes, general amendments are a good
approach. For example, the suggested amendment to Chapter 94-Privacy,
of Title 15 of the U.S. Code creating an additional subchapter titled
“AGGREGRATION OF NONPUBLIC PERSONAL INFORMATION
AND RADIO FREQUENCY INDENTIFICATION INFORMATION”
would protect collected information that is not intended to be public
information. However, the words “Radio Frequency Identification” should
not be included in order to avoid technology specific legislation. Included
in this section should be prohibitions against all technologies that gather
more information than is required to manage inventory. Additionally, as
suggested by the Right to Know Act, the language in the amendment should
prohibit disclosure of gathered information by electronic means to any third
party.
¶37

¶38
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) also
addresses the privacy of individuals. 103 The “act prohibits any person from
intentionally intercepting, or endeavoring to intercept wire, oral or
electronic communications by using an electronic, mechanical, or other
device unless the conduct is specifically authorized or expressly not
covered.” 104 Although the current language of the act does not specifically
cover RFID technology, small amendments to the act could encompass the
mal-intended behaviors of retailers and third-parties. 105
¶39
One of the paramount concerns to consumers is their lack of
awareness that the products they purchase are equipped with RFID
technology. Encompassed in the Wiretap Act 106 is the requirement that
“anyone who intercepts electronic communication will be held in violation
of the statute if proper consent has not been obtained.” 107 Amending the
102

Tavilla, supra note 21, at 15.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2000); see Levary, supra note 96.
104
Levary, supra note 96. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2000).
105
See John Eden, When Big Brother Privatizes: Commercial Surveillance, The
Privacy Act of 1974, and the Future of RFID, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0020
(2005), http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2005dltr0020.html.
106
18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000); see Levary, supra note 96.
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18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000).
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21

2007

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 3

Wiretap Act so that RFID communications fall within the purview of
electronic communications would suffice for the consent aspect of privacy
protection from RFID tracking. This amendment would require businesses
to obtain consent from consumers for RFID tracking. This need not be
onerous for businesses or consumers. Obtaining consent could simply
require a standard label on all items that have the ability to communicate
information to consumers. By purchasing items with conspicuous labels the
consumer is essentially consenting to information gathering 108 in the least
restrictive way needed by the business to achieve reasonable goals.
¶40
Since violations of many current privacy statutes impose criminality
on the violators, businesses have a strong incentive to remain within the
boundaries imposed by these and similar regulations. If retailers and
manufactures believe that RFIDs are important to their supply chains, they
will follow broad privacy legislation.

CONCLUSION
¶41
Since “the RFID train is beginning to leave the station, . . . now is
the right time to begin a national discussion about where, if at all, any lines
will be drawn to protect privacy.” 109 RFID technology provides many
benefits for the retail and consumer products industries. As more time
passes without the requisite legislation in place, consumers may lose the
ability to protect their privacy from RFID tracking, or businesses may be
faced with an unexpected halt to their RFID uses.
¶42
Individuals have a right to keep their private things, which include
information not typically available to the naked eye, private. However,
because intrusion upon seclusion, the typical conduit for privacy actions, is
unable to protect individuals’ privacy from RFID tracking by businesses, a
new standard is required. State legislation is inadequate and implanting
proposals from privacy advocates is unreasonable. This leaves federal
legislation as the means of privacy protection. Amending existing federal
privacy statutes, without enacting RFID-specific legislation, is the most
effective alternative to control the “global blanket” of RFIDs.

108

In this situation there is implied consent. “Implied consent is ‘consent in fact’
which is inferred ‘from surrounding circumstances indicating that the party
knowingly agreed to the surveillance.’” Williams v. Poulos 11 F.3d 271, 281
(1st Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir.
1987).
109
Senator Patrick Leahy, Panel Discussion on Video Surveillance: Legal and
Technological Challenges at Georgetown University Law Center (Mar. 23,
2004), available at http://www.spychips.com/alec-big-brother-barcodearticle.html.
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